INTRODUCTION
Since Brown v. Board of Education,' civil rights remedies have become exceedingly complex.2 Typically, these remedies benefit an amorphous class and involve affirmative acts to reform the structural and operational details of institutions such as schools, prisons, and hospitals.3 The object of a civil rights suit is the correction of some public wrong which, if allowed to continue, would further disadvantage a segment of the public, such as a minority group. 4 Professor Abram Chayes's brilliant discussion of the sharply contrasting features of public and private actions reveals the dominant role of public interests in public actions in contrast to the dominant role of parties in private actions.5 While the interest of the plaintiff is essential to the prosecution of private actions, the public nature of public actions minimizes the importance of the role played by traditional plaintiffs since their interests are shared by myriad other members of the relevant public. Thus, a new central concern in public actions is whether all interested persons have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard. 6 The interrelation of claim and remedy causes private action standing to sue to vest in a person whose injuries will be repaired by the relief dispensed.7 Standing, however, should not be important in public actions because the relief dispensed affects the interests of a scattered and diverse public. Indeed, civil rights actions have been prosecuted by institutional litigators such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the Justice Department, and the relief sought has been in the interest of a class. The naming of an individual as plaintiff is basically a concession to tradition; the named private plaintiff plays little role in financing the lawsuit, participating in the strategic choices, or specifying the relief.8 Thus, insistence upon compliance with standing rules, designed for the context of private actions, has forced a costly anachronism upon public actions-the doctrine of standing to sue.9
The decline in the importance of standing of plaintiffs in public actions and the public nature of public law remedies expose the need for adequate interest representation in the remediation process. The absence of representatives of the interests of members of classes and sub-classes could induce groups with conflicting interests to settle their differences in the proverbial neighborhood school yard.10 Such representation should be fashioned to democratize remedy planning, negotiation, and implementation. "At the stage of relief in particular, if the decree is to be quasi-negotiated and party participation is to be relied upon to ensure its viability, representation at the bargaining table assumes very great importance, not only from the point of view of the affected interests but from that of the system itself." 11 The problem of determining which interests are worthy of expression in the adjudicatory process is probably as ill-suited for public actions as is the current standing doctrine.12 Nonetheless, liberal deployment of rules governing class actions and intervention should answer the call for adequate representation in the remediation process. 13 This Article proposes that the doctrines now associated with standing, because they are not suited to the realities of public law litigation, be abandoned in favor of a more inclusionary use of class action and intervention rules to expand participation in the remediation process. The proposed shift from threshold standing to remediation representation would encourage the development of a jurisprudence of public law remedies. Such a jurisprudence would define the nature of public law remedies, goals, and styles of relief available in public law actions. Inclusionary intervention and class action rules would facilitate the democratic promulgation of first principles in this jurisprudence of remedies. Since standing is not mentioned in the Constitution, courts base its constitutional status on the historic content implicit in "cases or controversies." Yet, hard research has revealed no historical warrant for this assertion.24
Among the prudential justifications for threshold standing is the notion that standing promotes an efficient allocation of access to scarce judicial resources.25 "Access standing, then, means a judicial determination of whether the nature and extent of the alleged harm to a plaintiff are such as to warrant deciding his case." 26 Experience suggests, however, that, aside from the rule against collusive suits, threshold standing is not an efficient way to allocate access.27 Perhaps litigation costs more efficiently screen access to the courts; if the plaintiff does not have the minimal personal involvement Another justification for threshold standing is that it screens out parties who would not adequately represent the interests of other aggrieved persons. Rules of standing, however, simply fail to accomplish this task. One plaintiff can be granted standing although he is an inadequate representative of the interests of his class, while another, fully qualified representative is eliminated at the threshold for lack of standing. The courts have no standards for determining which persons or organizations are most representative of the universe of affected interests. As Professor Davis has stated: "The idea deserves a quiet burial. Standing should not depend upon the probable manner in which a party will present a case .... " 29 Courts often justify threshold standing by expressing their concern for limiting the judicial power to its proper role in the tripartite federal arrangement. "Without such limitations-closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance-the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights." 30 Although this is a legitimate concern, the role allocation burden is not easily carried by a doctrine which purports to have as its fundamental goal the measurement of the qualifications of the party seeking access. As defined by the courts, "personal stake" is not germane to the question of balance between judicial, legislative, and executive roles.
As an alternative to threshold standing, this Article proposes that the standing question be raised at the remediation stage of litigation. Before we can consider the merits of appellant's claim or the propriety of the relief requested, however, apellant must first demonstrate that she is entitled to invoke the judicial process. She must, in other words, show that the facts alleged present the court with a "case or controversy" in the constitutional sense and that she is a proper plaintiff to raise the issues sought to be litigated. The threshold question which must be answered is whether the appellant has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."37
The plaintiff's injury in fact was deemed insufficient to satisfy the requirements of threshold standing: "To be sure, appellant no doubt suffered an injury stemming from the failure of her child's father to contribute support payments. But the bare existence of an abstract injury meets only the first half of the standing requirement." 38 Without specifying whether the additional requirements were constitutionally compelled or prudentially selected, Justice Marshall considered standing to be determined by a benefit-of-the-remedy test: "Thus, if appellant were granted the requested relief, it would result only in the jailing of the child's father. The prospect that prosecution, will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative."
39
The fact that the Court would even consider the impact of relief as a threshold issue is itself significant. Whether a remedy benefits plaintiff depends upon the nature and style of relief granted and the remedial goals selected for protection. In Linda, for example, three sets of plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. A complex array of factual issues would be needed to decide whether the mother, the child, and the class should obtain and would benefit from these remedies. The Court can therefore be criticized for failing adequately to consider these difficult questions.40
The interplay between standing and remedies plays a subtle but significant role in Younger v. Harris and its progeny.4' In these cases, the Supreme Court answered the standing question by holding that one must be the target of a threatened or pending prosecution for violating the challenged statute to have standing to sue.42 The Court's response to the remediation question was that requests for federal injunctive and declaratory relief from enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute should not be granted except in unusual circumstances. 43 In Younger, Justice Black, writing for the Court, held that Harris had standing to seek injunctive relief on first amendment grounds to restrain the District Attorney of Los Angeles County from prosecuting him under California's criminal syndicalism statute. Standing was based on the fact that Harris had been indicted and was being prosecuted for violating the challenged act when the federal action was commenced. "He thus has an acute, live controversy with the State and its prosecutor." 44 The Court held, however, that three intervenors lacked standing because they had not been indicted for violating the statute. "[P]ersons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs in such cases." 45 That the standing prong of the Younger doctrine was not to be taken lightly was amply demonstrated in the case of Boyle v. Landry,46 decided on the same day as Younger. Black residents of Chicago, who had been arrested and prosecuted under a series of Illinois statutes, sought from a three-39. Id. Speculation that the father would pay, of course, was no less valid than the majority's speculation that he would not pay.
The "benefit-of-the-remedy" test has been reaffirmed in two subsequent decisions. Younger and Boyle thus created a "catch-22" effect for the plaintiff seeking an injunction against enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional state criminal statutes. One plaintiff-Harris--did cross the bar of standing, only to be stopped by the invalidity of the requested remedy. Thus, for Harris, the grounds sufficient to give standing-the existence of a live controversy in the form of a pending prosecution-proved to be precisely the basis for denying the relief requested.
Remedies, whether subsumed under the rubric of standing or federalism, should be decided at the remediation stage.49 Public law remediation in particular involves a complex set of fact-finding procedures. Threshold standing, whether granted or denied, does violence to the public interest in public law remediation by cutting off inquiry in advance of an informed judgment concerning public law remedies and by giving the false impression that a party with standing has interests different in kind and degree from those of others in the affected public.
Threshold standing does violence to the need for democracy in the remediation process, the need for devising remedies in accordance with the desires of all interested persons.50 In this regard, standing principles are as unfit for complex public law litigation as traditional contract law is for the modern world of mass produced and mass merchandized standard form contracts.51 The central issue in public law litigation should be whether the members of the affected public were given adequate notice and a fair opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.
Absentee representative to be based on injuries to the class as a whole.62 While an explicit adoption of this standard would be consistent with the public nature of public law actions and would abate the confusion currently surrounding standing in class actions, it would not reflect the interrelationship between standing and public law remediation since it does not factor into the analysis the extent to which negotiations for settlement have been conducted democratically. Traditional standing requirements effectively circumvent the negotiationsettlement remediation process. In National Urban League v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,63 eleven civil rights organizations sued four federal agencies for failing to adopt appropriate procedures to prevent race and sex discrimination in home mortgage lending. Three of the agencies entered into a settlement agreement after lengthy negotiations with the plaintiffs. These agencies agreed to adopt examination and enforcement procedures designed to alleviate racial discrimination by home mortgage lenders subject to federal regulation. The fourth agency, the Federal Reserve Board, refused to settle, claiming that its existing supervisory policies prevented unlawful discrimination. The Board's motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that the Urban League neither had standing in its own right nor as a representative of injured members. The court's finding of lack of standing was based on the absence of injury in fact and a causal connection between the injury asserted and the relief sought. These traditional tests were applied despite the fact that plaintiffs had expended substantial amounts of money and energy pressing, negotiating, and settling its claims with the agencies.
Standing presents a continuing threat to democratically negotiated remedies. In Rizzo v. Goode,64 two groups of class plaintiffs sought an injunction against the Mayor of Philadelphia and various police supervisory officials to compel them to end the "assertedly pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers . . . directed against minority citizens in particular and against all Philadelphia residents in general." 65 Upon finding that police officers had violated constitutional rights with such frequency that "they cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances," 66 the federal district court directed the defendants to draft a comprehensive plan for processing civilian complaints. Although plaintiffs and defendants arrived at a remediation plan satisfactory to all parties,67 the Supreme Court suggested that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. Instead of focusing on standing to sue, the Court should have scrutinized the remediation process to determine whether all interests were represented in the negotiations. Given the presence of adequate representation, the negotiated remedy should be allowed to stand. At that juncture, rejection of the negotiated remedy because of the failure to satisfy mechanical standing rules must be read as a plea for undemocratic, standard-form adjudication. Standing rules unreasonably delay the remediation process. Even the strictest conception of injury in fact may be satisfied in public actions by finding the member of the affected public whose injuries satisfy standing requirements. Thus, Sierra Club v. Morton68 wound its way through the courts to the Supreme Court where the Sierra Club was found to lack standing. Yet, on remand from the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs easily satisfied the injury in fact requirements.69
Standing deters the development of a coherent jurisprudence of public law remedies. Public law adjudication breaks sharply with the traditional model of adjudication.70 Yet, the rules of standing, born in the traditional, binary form of litigation, have been imposed upon the public, multiple party model. The tendency to stay with the traditional is understandable. Nonetheless, the surface simplicity of familiar doctrines masks the submerged complexities of public law remediation.7' Indeed, standing is an effective device for delaying the inevitable confrontation between the Supreme Court and its obligation to prescribe a jurisprudence of public law remedies.72 Many of the standing cases suggest that the Court fears the consequences of continuing, injunctive relief. The Court, however, should recognize that threshold standing has outlived its usefulness in public law litigation and should squarely face the issues posed by public law remediation.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the doctrine of standing is ill-equipped to respond to the realities of modern federal litigation. The process of selecting proper parties to participate in public law adjudication must be guided by principles which promote rather than retard the development of a jurisprudence of public law adjudication. Such principles must therefore be responsive to the dominating characteristic of public law litigation: sprawling and amorphous parties seek- result in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest and a significant benefit would be conferred on a large class of persons, the plaintiff should be allowed to sue despite failure to satisfy traditional standing requirements. Capacity to sue in public law litigation would be determined by considering the societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation, the number of people who would benefit from the action, and the necessity for private enforcement.75
The proper role of the judiciary in the tripartite federal government and efficiency in the allocation of access to judicial remedies could be guarded by reliance on the standards for determining whether claims qualify for relief.76 The law of remedies has a long and familiar tradition of denying relief to persons whose relations to the case are deemed insufficient.77 Centuries of experience in dispensing remedies should guide the courts in deciding whether parties are eligible for obtaining injunctions, damages, and restitution. Equitable remedies have exacted higher access standards by requiring that aspirants establish irreparable harm as a prerequisite to obtaining relief. The dominant role of equitable remedies in public law adjudication enhances the control traditional rules of equity should have in guiding the court in its selection of cases suitable for adjudication. As experience in the administration of public law remedies grows, requirements for obtaining relief should evolve to accommodate the need for public advocacy by private persons. 
